12 Rolling

One of These Things Is Not Like the Other:
Art Education and the Symbolic Interaction
Of Bodies and Self-images
James H. Rolling, Jr.
This article begins with the premise that self-imagery is constituted
as a shape-shifting aggregate of symbolic systems that incorporates
the human body itself as one ofits representations. At intermittent
points of the body's embodiment of visual cultute and tacit
social experience, alternative representations accrete into varying
symbolic systems, the multiple shapes a self-image may take over a
lifetime. Given that social identity is derived from the interaction
of various symbolic systems, how do some bodies and selfimages come to be taken as that of identities incompatible with
most others? In this exploration of the self-image and identity,
the author reconsiders the purposes of art education in human
development, especially when the self-image is given primacy over
the objects we typically plan to make in the classroom.

Mr. Hooper's Store

I have a vivid memory of watching "Sesame Street" segments
when I was little, where Susan or Bob or Gordon or Mr. Hooper
would sing a variation of the categorization song that includes the
lines, "One of these things is not like the other," or "One of these
groups just doesn't belong here." This was in the early 1970s. I was
being bussed to school in a White neighborhood, caught up in the
nation's movement to address the social injustice of the unequal
quality of schooling in ghettoes like the one I grew up in, located in a
Brooklyn neighborhood called Crown Heights. It was eerie listening
to these songs, watching little White boys and girls and little Black
boys and girls sitting together in Mr. Hooper's store while no one
addressed the giant blue furry elephant right there in the storefront
with them. Even as a youngster, I was very much aware that most
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people had long been quite comfortable with the idea that the kids
sitting at Mr. Hooper's counter did not truly belong together. Even
I knew that this was reason for the absence of White bodies on my
narrow block in Brooklyn, and the absence of Black bodies anywhere
near the wide lawns of homes in Sheepshead Bay. But this idea-the
idea of different categories of bodies and of bodies that belong and
do not belong-has generated many other stories worth noting.
Scientific and Narrative Traits
Science tells me that bodies have physical traits, distinguishing
characteristics that can be named, labeled, or categorized, and which
are reproduced and passed along genetically from one generation to
the next. So when, during the last week of June, I was diagnosed by
a physician as showing symptoms of the onset of diabetes mellitus, I
was also asked whether either of my parents had diabetes. The answer
was yes, my father, who died of diabetes-related complications at age

63.
Storytelling tells me that physical bodies also have narrative
traits, distinguishing characteristics that can be named, labeled,
or categorized, and which are also represented and passed along
genetically from one generation to the next. For instance, in
elementary school there was Thomas, seemingly always behind
me on the schoolbus, who I allowed the minor social infraction of
thumbing and rubbing the frizz of my hair, massaging the scalp of
a quality of head clearly alien to his friendly white fingertips. This
became mildly embarrassing in that I had never before truly embodied
the representation of my hair texture as unlike the others. In high
school, there was David, who pointed out that the skin on each of my
knuckles, skin genetically thicker than his, was crinkled and scored
in a manner that reminded him mostly of a reptile, a texture clearly
alien to his friendly brown eyes. This was quite embarrassing in that
I had never before embodied the representation that my skin texture
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was not like the others. Embarrassment, or tacit bodily awareness, is
an indication that social stigma has been embodied.
I have a story I must tell, one that tells something significant

about art education and its place in the world, a story told most
simply through personal narrative. First-person explanations-"the
life story that people themselves tell about who they are, and why"
(Carey, 2007, ~ I)-are a useful research tool, especially as researchers
become more confident that "narrative themes are, as much as any
other trait, driving factors in people's behavior" (~ 12). This story
begins with the following question: As I reviewed the literature for
my dissertation, an effort to generate new knowledge in the field of
art education, why was I drawn to the work of scholars like Simi
Linton (1998) and Erving Coffman (1963), scholars who are central
to the field of Disability Studies, when neither the art education or
disability studies fields are quite like the other?

Convergences, Negations, and the Interaction of Categories
All research communicates stories, or the paradigms that support
those stories. The story I wish to tell today came to the surface of my
consciousness through a series of convergences as I began to conceive
this article. On the eve of my start in the role as chair of the Art
Education Department, I had been asking myself why art education
is so irrelevant to so many, and so misunderstood in so many circles.
Frankly, even as I have dedicated my life to professing its significance
to me, art education as taught by art education professionals was
non-existent in my elementary and middle school years. Why isn't
art education included in the same category as reading, writing, and
arithmetic as one of the essentials of a good education? Why isn't art
education like the others?
Why are students of color overwhelmingly pathologized as a
special education population in public schools? Disability studies
scholar David]. Connor (2008) cites the work of scholars within
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the field of Disability Studies who do not view impairments as
"medicalized deficits (physical, sensory, emotional, or intellectual),"
but rather "as natural human differences categorized as 'disabilities' by
a society reticent to reorganize through the removal of barriers and
restrictions" to those who are different (Connor, 2008, p. 452, my
italics). In the identification of students to receive special education
services, ''African-Americans are three times as likely to receive
the label of mental retardation and twice as likely to be labeled
emotionally disturbed in comparison to Whites" (Connor, 2008, p.
458).
I saw a glimpse of this phenomenon firsthand in the aftermath
of a Sunday service as I observed the 6-year-old son of a friend
at my church. The child's parents were in the music ministry, his
father a drummer. As was his habit, the young boy had climbed
behind the drums after the service and was playing them intently,
auto didactically focused on keeping exact rhythm with a couple
of the musicians still fingering the keyboard and the bass guitar.
Having worked with children identified as gifted for many years at
Hunter College Elementary School, I knew some of the signs and
mentioned them casually to his parents. It turns out that they had
suspected their son's giftedness ever since he had begun speaking in
full sentences unusually early in his development. Months later, I had
a second conversation with his mother. She related her frustrations
with acts of social determinism apparent in the school her son had
recently been attending. The teachers there had already labeled her
son, only in kindergarten, 'a problem child' who was in need of
special attention because of all his kinetic energy, the kind of energy
any percussionist is sure to exude from time to time. When the
child's mother countered that she believed her son was gifted, the
incredulous retort was, "Well, who told you that?" The implication
was that if the school's professionals had not declared the boy to be
gifted, it could not be so. This boy was one of the very few Black
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children in a predominantly White school. Why aren't Black boys
included in the same category as those taken for granted as ablebodied, able-minded, and normal? Why aren't Black boys and girls
like the others?
Senator Joseph Biden, at the start of his campaign for the 2008
Democratic presidential primary, felt it appropriate to distinguish
one of his competitors, Senator Barack Obama, as follows: "I mean,
you got the first mainstream African-American who is articulate and
bright and clean and a nice-looking guy. I mean, that's a storybook,
man" (Tapper, 2007). Now I will admit here that I have long held
insecurities about my personal ability to speak in the greater public
arena, probably due to the invisibility in the media of other folks
who looked like me addressing the ''American'' public. But there
have always been articulate, bright, clean, and nice-looking leaders
in Black communities. Why aren't the many Black leaders from my
neighborhood illuminated in the national and international media
and included in the same category as those taken for granted as
mainstream, articulate, bright, clean, nice-looking? Why aren't Black
men and women like the others?
I recently rented the movie "Miss Evers' Boys," a 1997 HBO
film. It tells of a clinical study gone awry, the infamous Tuskegee
Study of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male, which was conducted
under the auspices of the U.S. Public Health Service from 1932
through 1972. In this 40 year study, the longest non-therapeutic
scientific experiment on human beings in medical history, 600
African-American sharecroppers were studied in Macon County,
Alabama-399 chronic syphilitics and a control group of 201 men
without syphilis-under a ruse that deceived the participants into
believing that were indeed being treated for what was known in the
vernacular as "bad blood." Placebo treatments, medical hyperbole,
and promises offuneral benefits were all plied in the place of informed
consent. Long after penicillin had become the standard and effective
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treatment for syphilis, the men who were recruited as human guinea
pigs during this effort to watch the natural progression of this fatal
disease, lived and died without ever being informed that they were
not being treated for anything at all. How could this take place?
Easily-this study took place in an era when the lives of the Black
men, women, and children, if valued at all, were certainly not valued
the same as those who were White.
In fact, the prevailing definition was that of the utter abnormality
of the descendants of slaves as was declaimed by Samuel Chapman
Armstrong, founder of the Hampton Normal and Agricultural
Institute in 1868 for the manual training of colored people.
Armstrong was of the opinion that his charges were mentally, morally,
and materially destitute, each one burdened with the unfortunate
affiiction of a number of birth defects issuing forth in the form
of "[h]is low ideas of life and duty, his weak conscience, his want
of energy and thrift," and "his indolent, sensuous tropical blood"
(Kliebard, 1999, p. 14). The long-prevailing prescription of an
education appropriate for a Negro was explicated by John Dollard in
his expose of a Southern town in the 1930s where schools were used
"to educate the Negro in order to fit him for place first as a slave and
then as a caste man in society," an educational trajectory that would
"prepare him for, but not beyond, the opportunities of lower-class
status" (Kliebard, 1999, p. 224). These words and institutions and
the ideas they represent have become a part of the layering of Black
self-image. Why aren't the bodies of Black laborers included in the
same category as those taken for granted as valuable, non-defective,
and worth the investment of social capital? Why aren't Black bodies
like the others?
I happened across a television interview with popular journalist
and author Malcolm Gladwell (2005), author of the book Blink:

The Power of Thinking Without Thinking, in which he explores rapid
cognition, "the sort of snap decision-making performed without
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thinking about how one is thinking, faster and often more correctly
than the logical part of the brain can manage" (Lasser, 2007, ~ 2).
In the course of the interview, Gladwell-who could pass as White
in many circles even though one of his parents is Jamaican-related
the phenomenon of snap judgments to how pejorative stereotypes
are assigned, citing Harvard's Implicit Association Test, and the fact
that ever since he let his hair grow out into a prominent afro, he has
been stopped by police while traveling about in what seem to be snap
decisions by those authorities and certainly without just cause. Why
isn't Black hair like the others?
Finally, on a recent episode of the Oprah show a long-standing
crisis in self-image and identity was revisited as Black children were
asked to categorize their preferences and distastes for White baby
dolls that don't look like them and Black baby dolls that do in Kiri
Davis's eight-minute documentary, ''A Girl Like Me." One of several
young ladies who were also interviewed in the video expresses near
the end how "Everybody else in society is throwing their ideas and
what they believe we should be at us [sic]." Why aren't the self-images
of Blacks included in the same category as those taken for granted
as valuable, central to the popular culture, and worth opening up all
media avenues and opportunities for Blacks to self-promote? Why
aren't Black self-images and self-esteem like the others?

Identity as Reinterpretation
The previous convergences are just starting points. Ultimately,
I am interested in the intersectionality of all self-images in an
Information Age, not just Black self-image. In a May 10,2007, New

York Times website multimedia presentation about a new exhibition
at the Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture in Harlem
called "Stereotypes vs. Humantypes," images featuring Blacks in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries were displayed revealing how
Widespread stereotyped and distorted representations of Blacks were
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during that time period ("Fact vs. Fiction," 2007). But the exhibition
also showcases a concurrent phenomenon that was almost invisible
and is still for the most part unknown: images that sketched the
undistorted, uncaricatured life of Blacks at home, in weddings, at
play-images of common everyday life in opposition to multiple
social and scientific discourses declaiming Black abnormality and
pathology-images reiterated and reappearing in the old photos in
shoeboxes, in the corners of cracked dresser drawers, in crumbling
envelopes on closet shelves, in heavy attic trunks, in frames adorning
faded wallpaper. What can we learn from this? If nothing else, I
believe we can relearn the purpose of art education if we take a new
look at the reinterpretation of Mrican American identity that took
place in the midst of centuries of visual cultural vilification, a perfect
storm of imagery that told only of our ugliness and unacceptability
in the world. This reinterpretation was worked through the arts
surrounding the Harlem Renaissance as much as it was anyplace else
(Harris, 2003; Willis, 2000).
All educators ought to celebrate any group's ability to visibly
reinterpret personal and social significance. What if the ranks of
art educators were charged with developing the human ability to
def)r disparaging labels and expectations and to lead meaningful and
transforming lives in spite of the persistent social will to stigmatize?
What if art educators were to take up the charge of opening up
curricular spaces for students to locate personal significance for
themselves, along with the agency to change the signifiers they have
thus far embodied? To paraphrase one of the catchphrases from the
popular new television show Heroes, "Save the self-image, save the
world."

Self-imagery as a Symbol System
The conception of the self as an instrument of inquiry has
birthed whole new branches of qualitative inquiry (Eisner, 1991).
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However, the self is not a form in itself, but a shape-shifting arena of
possibilities bounded and overwritten by a palimpsest of self-images
making sense over and over again of our experience of the world.
A reading of the self is complicated with arrays of diaphanous selfimages, an archaeological layering of "verbal images" and "mental
images." As it signifies an aspect of self, a "verbal image" is a name;
if a "word is an image of an idea, and an idea is an image of a thing"
(Mitchell, 1986, p. 22), then a name is simply an image of a proposed
identity, not dissimilar from a label, category, or stereotype, none of
which are necessarily true or even apt. Yet once applied, a name,
label, category, or stereotype becomes a part of the archaeology of
self-imagery, a part of the emerging story.
A "mental image" of self is akin to the narrative of personal
memory, images of the self held in mind that have been impressed
on us by the experience of our selves as reflected back to us in our
passage through the world (Mitchell, 1986, p. 22). To explain further,
philosopher David Hume is cited as describing the remnants left after
memory's dynamic process of minimization both as "faint images"
and "decayed sensation" (Mitchell, 1986, p. 23). Thus, a memory
is a selective remnant of an experience, a motion picture dissolve, a
glancing recollection of texture, an echo, a whiff of a scent, packed
with dense, continuous meaning. Every memory is a symbol. Every
self-image is in vertiginous alignment with a deeper archaeology
of identity, that is to say, a multiformational arrangement of
representations that is manifested in the visual culture, a construction
that tells who you are like and who you are not like, hybridic at
times, subliminal at times, always interactional, all images contesting
for preeminence and position in the constitution of a larger story of
identity, the story of who I am and of who we be.
While some may understand identity as an immutable text, I
see identity as the gaps in the deterministic text, the possibilities that
redress our certainties and our destinies, the parts of the story that
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cannot be scripted because they are still being contested, because
they have not yet been lived. For those who rail against inappropriate
names and unwanted self-images, there is a danger and there is a
hope. Identity tantalizingly presents itself intact and may then be
immediately overwritten, either as an act of malicious or indifferent
subjugation, or as an act of self-preservation. According to Julia
Kristeva, "a text works by absorbing and destroying at the same time
the other texts of the intertextual space" (cited in Marshall, 1992, p.
130). Identity can thus be understood as an ongoing interpretation,
pertaining to whatever experience holds true for those situated within
their particular context-boundedness (Eisner, 1991). In writing
on the act of interpretation, Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor
(1976) suggests that there are multiple phenomena that, although
not text, are analogous to text in that we treat them as the objects of
our interpretation:
Interpretation, in the sense relevant to hermeneutics, is an attempt
to make clear, to make sense of an object of study. This object
must, therefore, be a text, or a text-analogue, which in some way
is confused, incomplete, cloudy, seemingly contradictory-in
one way or another, unclear. The interpretation aims to bring to
light an underlying coherence or sense. (p. 153)
Our self-images do not reconstitute facts about us. What is a
fact? It is a thing that is incontestably the case.

In the realm of

law, a fact is the purported truth about a case as opposed to any
interpretation of said facts. However, if you, like me, have ever had
difficulty relating the facts about a particular situation, have you ever
fully considered why that is? It is because you have not yet generated
an interpretation of the interacting facts, events, and emotions
surrounding that particular situation-you haven't yet formed it
into a story. Our representations of the world we know and of what
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we do aren't based on facts-they are founded on our needs, on our
desires, on our hopes, on our beliefs, on our desperation, on our
shaping of some oasis of order out of the chaos. We are compelled
to give life a shape.

In other words, the facts that populate our

histories are meaningless in and of themselves until someone renders
those facts significant by interpreting them. A truth held dear always
begins by sorting disparate facts into a re-cognizable relationship, a
story we will be able to recall, remember, and relate to others. The
truths we hold dear are, thus, interpretations. We go even further
to make art and discourse and imagery of those interpretations by
exaggerating the things we hold most significant, embellishing the
things that mesmerize, distract, and hold our attention, heightening
the saliencies that texture our existence. Ironically, our facility at
shaping variations of truth around the very same facts makes any
interpretation of facts highly contestable.
Our self-images are variations in an ongoing and embodied and
personal story; thus, they are malleable. Self-image, like memory, can
be erased by time or modified as facts are forgotten or misremembered ·
over time. Self-image can be contorted by falsehoods or accusations.
Self-image can be invaded by trauma or brain lesion. Self-image can be
altogether disconnected from factuality and be reinforced by fictional
episodes or fantasies. Self-image can be recalled by alternative cues,
and be remembered in emotional keys varying from the discordant
to the melodious. For instance, on a day full of embarrassments
that assault the mind and stresses that expose the body, self-imagery
might represent itself with fits of visceral self-loathing. Yet, on a day
when the mind and body are stroked with a sense of belonging, selfimagery will shape itself at rest in a harbor connecting it to all the trade
routes on the social map. An individual's archaeology of self-imagery
IS

a story-in-progress. The story is intuitively told, proceeding "from

everything we know and everything we are;" the story is improvised,
and as with all improvisations, converges "on the moment from a
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rich plurality of directions and sources" (Nachmanovitch, 1990, p.

40).
Symbolic Interaction
So how do we as art educators "save the self-image?" How do
we "save the world" from the contemporary crisis in self-image?
Postmodernist assumptions view identity constructs as narrative
admixtures spoken in polyphonous sign systems, "a multiplicity
of ironic and conflicting interdependent voices that can only be
understood contextually, ironically, relationally, and politically"
(Slattery, 2001, p. 374). Does this really have anything to do with
art education at all? What if I told you that my job description as an
art educator has never been to teach students to make pretty pictures
and things, or the history of pretty pictures and things, or how to
perceive when a picture or thing is pretty, or how to persuade others
of the prettiness of a picture or thing in words that are captivatingly
pretty?
I submit that my job as an art educator is actually much simpler
than this; it only has three moving parts. My job is first to open up
curricular spaces where students can picture themselves in the world,
no matter whether that picture is pretty or not, locating self-image
along with the agency

to

reinterpret the signifiers they have thus far

embodied; secondly, my job is to open up a space where students can
picture a more just and refined world, critiquing the cultural stories
we hold to be socially significant or insignificant and exercising their
acquired agency to make changes along the way; thirdly, my job is
to open up a space where students can practice and expand upon a
repertoire of marks, movements, and modelings that will make visible
the self-imagery and stories that they have rendered to be personally
and socially significant, capturing the attention of others so that they
too may see, share the vision, and find common meaning.
Michael Parsons (1992) cites Charles Taylor's suggestion that
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anything interpretable must be a text or text-analogue. Interpretable
events are the stuff that constitute the aggregate site ofidentity. What
we see, hear, and emotionally experience, becomes us. Identities
then may be viewed as semiotic creations, the archaeology of which
is expanded by each ensuing reinterpretation. Identities are signs.
Umberto Eco (1976) writes that, "A sign is everything which can be
taken as significantly substituting for something else" (p. 7).
Identity is a meta-symbol, a by-product of the symbolic systems
of verbal and mental imagery by which we construct or re-construct
our version of the world. Walter Truett Anderson (1997) claims that
"personal identities would be hard to locate without the network of
symbols within which we are defined and the internal monologue
with which we continually remind ourselves who we think we
are" (p. 263). As a meta-symbol composed of sub-archaeologies
of self-imagery, an identity is a living text. Identities are also then
intertextual. Brenda Marshall, citing a definition of intertextuality
by Jacques Derrida, describes a system ofinterrelationships "between
the psyche, society, [and] the world" (Marshall, 1992, p. 122).
In the field of sociology, the term symbolic interactionism refers
to "the theory that the meaning of symbols is determined through
the Course of human interaction" ("Symbolic interactionism," 2007,
~ 1). According to a Wikipedia article, Herbert Blumer (1969) set

forth the major tenets of symbolic interactionism as follows:
1. "Human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings
that the things have for them"
2. "The meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of,
the social interaction that one has with one's fellows"
3. "These meanings are handled in, and, modified through, an
interpretive process used by the person in dealing with the things
he/she encounters"
With the interaction of symbolic systems in mind, reclaiming
the relevance of art education necessarily involves a rethinking of
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art education. If we rethink art education, we must also rethink our
approach to the objectives of the art education curriculum. Focusing
for a moment on my job description to open up curricular spaces
where students can picture themselves as critical agents in the world,
I would argue that traditional art educational curriculum planning
clogs up the spaces to extend and deepen self-imagery with its jumpcut, object-centered focus-make a little bit of pottery, then a few
prints, then some observational drawings, then a painting or two,
with a little bit of jewelry making or some digital photography, if we
can squeeze it in. There is little attempt to facilitate the construction
of extended personal narratives as rendered by our students, through
curricular sequences that engender new self-imagery and new
installments in the continuum of our collective story.
If "human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings
that the things have for them," why not allow students to work in
the media they hold most significant, elaborating on the subjects
they identify as being most significant to them irrespective of our
professional teacherly desires? Educators need only

to

mark out

the widest possible thematic parameters and allow students to find
their way to the specificity they desire. Youngsters have no difficulty
finding the stories they want to tell or re-tell; all we need to do is
give them the permission

to

fill in the gaps of their choice. The

major adjustment for educators is to no longer think in terms of
class projects, but rather in terms of individual projects. 1his will
be more work for us in some ways and less work in other senses as
the individuals in our classrooms and studios are given the license

to

interact with each other and with us as independent agents on their
projects, in keeping with Blumer's (1969) assertion that the meaning
of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction
that one has with one's fellows.
In Jane Gooding- Brown's (2000) examination of the social
construction of self and difference, and the negotiation of established
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interpretations as an agency for change, she argues that a disruptive
model of interpretation can initiate incursions that reposition story
values. Robert McKee (1997) defines a story's values as the "qualities
of human experience that may shift from positive to negative, or
negative to positive, from one moment to the next" (p. 34). One could
say that the great efficiency of disruptive discursive repositioning is
the ability to alter a story not by attaching an amendment to the story,
but rather by infiltrating the story sequence and flipping the polarity,
so to speak, of definitive events already ensconced in the narrative.
The authorities have no defense against it. It is through the agency to
alternate the currents of their lives that the meanings most significant
to our students are "handled," "modified," and reinterpreted. Agency
is conceived here not as the "freedom to do whatever the subject wills
but rather freedom to constitute oneself in an unexpected mannerto decode and recode one's identity (Stinson, 2004, p. 57).
Our bodies and bodies of knowledge are evidentiary. They
are documentary. We position these bodies to tell stories-to tell
histories, sometimes slightly false, sometimes barely true, but
always significant enough to marshal our attention. Some wield the
power to trap bodies in names, labels, categories, or stereotypes.
Sometimes we must reposition our bodies to save our lives and
liberate our self-images. Somehow, in the years succeeding the great
Harlem Renaissance literary reinterpretation designated as 'the New
Negro,' the old broken, whipped and degraded Negro body was
also reinterpreted as a document of strength and beauty, yet no less
Black! These were reinterpretations that altered the visual culture of

"America," connoting humanity rather than monstrosity.
In the music video from the 2001 song "Who We Be," rap star

DMX questions whether or not the dominant culture really knows
who he, or any African American for that matter, really is. At several
points in the video, brilliantly directed by Korean American Joseph
Kahn, the rapper's body is digitally recoded, his image repositioning
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itself, a floating signifier interacting throughout social history, caught
up in the visual cultural drama of "America's" most significant events
and the rapper's most salient surroundings, events that, in truth, are
already subsumed within the archaeology of DMX's self-imagery.
Ultimately, D MX appears to conclude that who he is is not at all
bound up in difference, but that he could be just as well represented
by anyone of the number of children, each of unspecified ethnic
origin, who identify themselves in his stead in the closing seconds
of the video. Likewise, each of those children could be just as well
represented by the final image of DMX himself in the concluding
frame; DMX and the children are intersectionalities, alternating
currents for one another's self-image. DMX cannot be held behind
prison bars that tell him he is not like the others.
Art educators, take note: the question, "Who am I?" posed by
an inquiring and creative mind is likely the most powerful thing we
have going for us as we decide who we be as teaching professionals in
the 21 st century.
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